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ABSTRACT 
This article identifies, describes and analyzes arguments for and against more 
transparent government communication about its policy intentions. In our view the 
advantages from improved government communication are: (a) the Government can 
counterbalance misleading and/or incorrect information from the opposition; (b) 
communication about policy intentions can reduce and/or avoid possible public 
surprises, misunderstandings, resistance, frustrations and speculations, and increase 
efficiency; and (c) due to such communication, citizens are informed regarding several 
points of view, which is an important democratic value. We see the disadvantages of 
greater transparency as: (a) public money may be used to spread propaganda; (b) there 
is an increased risk of confusion between policy intentions and actual policy decisions; 
and (c) the Parliament is not the first body to be informed about the Government’s 
intention. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article identifies, describes and analyzes the most important arguments for and 
against more transparent government communication about its policy intentions. In our 
view the advantages from improved government communication are: (a) the 
Government can counterbalance misleading and/or incorrect information from the 
opposition; (b) communication about policy intentions can reduce and/or avoid possible 
public surprises, misunderstandings, resistance, frustrations and speculations, and 
increase efficiency; and (c) due to such communication, citizens are informed regarding 
several points of view, which is an important democratic value. We see the 
disadvantages of greater transparency as: (a) public money may be used to spread 
propaganda; (b) there is an increased risk of confusion between policy intentions and 
actual policy decisions; and (c) the Parliament is not the first body to be informed about 
the Government’s intention. 
This introduction explains the goals and boundaries of our research and then explores 
the relative importance of more transparent public communication about policy 
intentions, and provides examples of the most disputed format of such communication, 
i.e. the use of publicly financed publicity (advertisements, leaflets), for communicating 
policy intentions. 
What? 
External public sector communication presents different challenges and may require 
additional effort compared to communication in the private sector, as is indicated by a 
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recent empirical study by Pandey and Garnett (2006) and Gelders, Bouckaert and Van 
Ruler (forthcoming).  This article analyzes the arguments for and against external public 
communication about policy intentions or "policy that has been considered or adopted 
by a minister of a Government but that has not yet been adopted by a higher body such 
as the Government or the Parliament".  Our research is conducted in the West European 
context of parliamentary governments in which the Executives are composed of teams 
of Prime Ministers and ministers that emanate from Parliament. 
The arguments made during the debate about the admissibility and desirability of 
communication about policy intentions initially stems from the discourse about the pros 
and cons of openness vs. closeness of organizations, freedom of information in 
particular, and from literature regarding interactive policy making (e.g. Page 2001, p. 
147-151).  Although we specifically distinguish between communication about policy 
intentions and interactive policy-making (see below), some arguments for and against 
interactive policy-making are also applicable to communication about policy intentions.  
This article is based on the literature mentioned above as well as on the arguments 
mentioned in the recent Dutch debate on the governmental use of paid publicity in the 
formulation stage of the policy making process. 
There is little empirical research available that supports or rejects specific arguments for 
or against public communication about policy intentions.  Exceptions include the Dutch 
public monitoring and media analyses conducted in the case of the toll roads (see 
below) and the Belgian research conducted by Gelders (2005a).  Gelders studied what 
citizens know about announced, but not yet adopted policies in some Belgian cases.  
Based on surveys, he concluded that even highly educated and involved respondents 
knew little about the most central elements of policy issues and much less than most 
Belgian citizens generally know about policies (see below).  He showed that the huge 
number of policy announcements as well as poor communication about them caused 
confusion among citizens regarding what was only an intention and what was already a 
decision. 
Consequently, this article is mainly a theoretical description of the arguments for and 
against. 
Despite a close connection with interactive policy-making that is often present in the 
formulation stage of the policy-making process (e.g. Weeks 2000; Mayer, Edelenbos, 
and Monnikhof 2005), we explicitly distinguish communication about policy intentions 
from interactive policy-making.  The former is characterized by unidirectional 
persuasion and argumentation while the latter is more explicitly characterized by a 
collective search for an answer to a policy problem (e.g. 
http://www.minaz.nl/wallage/content/bijlagen.htm). 
The issue of communication about policy intentions has many interfaces with policy 
sciences, not all of which can be considered in this article.  However, as an introduction 
to the subject, we mention some points that merit attention.  Following Howlett and 
Ramesh (1996, p. 9-15) as well as Van de Graaf and Hoppe (1996), we must put the 
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distinction between 'not yet adopted policy' and 'adopted policy' in proper perspective.  
The stages of policy adoption and policy implementation are actually interwoven:
1
 
(1) Policy may be formally decided while, in practice, not all decisions are final; 
(2) Policy may not be approved officially but, upon implementation, certain aspects 
become finalized; 
(3) Policies may be adopted as a whole or in parts. 
 
WHY HAS PUBLIC COMMUNICATION ABOUT POLICY INTENTIONS 
BECOME SO IMPORTANT? 
Communication about policy intentions has become increasingly important yet more 
delicate during the past decades.  Explanations for these changes may be found in 
developments within politics, public administration, society, and the media. 
Developments such as the move of national politics towards other state levels and 
towards other societal actors (media, multinationals, pressure groups) resulted in less 
autonomous power for those who govern.  Traditional centers of power are being 
hollowed-out by a new governance in a context in which multiple actors and levels 
interact (e.g. Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003; Demortain 
2004).  Executive ministers are challenged to make a difference and to demonstrate their 
good intentions and efforts, also because citizens expect more efficient public 
performances or deeds (Brans, Facon, and Hoet 2003, p. 3).  Public communication 
about policy intentions offers executive ministers an attractive way to demonstrate their 
good intentions. 
Developments such as individualization explain why it is not easy for ministers to know 
what citizens think about policy intentions.  Interacting with media and floating trial 
balloons can help revealing the extent to which people are for or against an idea or 
whether or not citizens are willing to accept policy changes.  Floating trial balloons is a 
popular instrument used to facilitate in the preparation of legislation (Linsky 1986; 
Cook 2001).  It is also a cheaper and more flexible alternative than interactive policy-
making and it facilitates dealing with the shortcomings of the representative democracy 
(Meyer 2002; Louw 2005).  The less pronounced ideological characteristics of present-
day political parties has only sharpened the interest of politicians to distinguish 
themselves from (each) other(s).  This is also illustrated in the huge amount of publicly 
communicated policy intentions during a premature phase of the policy-making process. 
 
                                                 
1 The study of public administration shows two opposing views on policy and policy processes: the 
classical analytical view (policy considered as part of a policy-making process with distinct stages) versus 
the political view (policy as part of a continuum) (see e.g. Parsons, 1995; Howlett & Ramesh, 1996). 
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Following current media logics, content, representation and elbow-room given to the 
actors involved in political media coverage are steered by the preferences and the 
modus operandi of the media themselves rather than by current events (Van Praag 
2004).  As the overall ability of the media has increased, the reach of individual media 
and, in particular, that of the news program has decreased (Neijens and Sprenger 2005, 
p. 263).  This competitive situation increased the importance of breaking the story and 
being the first to report on the policy intention of a minister.  Striving for the attention 
of the viewer/listener/reader, the media does not always clearly mention if the 
ministerial message only deals with policy intentions or with already made policy 
decisions.  Eye-catching headlines are at times more important than factual information 
or clarifications on the status of the issue within the policy-making process.  The active 
interpretative role of the media (Patterson 1996), their preference for conflicts and their 
strategic considerations result in a strong preoccupation with what occurs before policy 
has officially been adopted (Van Praag 2001). 
Paid publicity: most disputed 
The developments mentioned above illustrate the importance as well as the controversy 
of governmental communication regarding policy intentions.  The use of paid publicity 
such as newspaper ads and governmental leaflets to communicate policies that have not 
yet been adopted by the legislative assembly is a case in point.  There is indeed a thin 
line between neutral public information provisions and political propaganda.  The 
particular position of a minister may cast a shadow over the exact aim of the message: is 
it propaganda (personal or political) and therefore a misuse of public money, or is it 
supplying transparent information in a democratic state aimed at informing and 
involving citizens and societal organizations regarding the formation of a policy?
2
 
The campaign regarding the reform of the United States Post Office raised similar 
questions (Linsky 1986).  Leaflets in the United Kingdom on Operation Rescue and 
Paying for Local Government: the Need for Change did the same (Scammell 1999). 
Other pre-eminent examples include the dissemination of leaflets on the introduction of 
toll-roads by the Dutch Government
 
(Kranendonk 2003), the dissemination of flyers on 
drug policies in Belgium (Gelders and Van Mierlo 2004), and governmental newspaper 
ads on 'Working longer' in Belgium (Gelders 2005a).  Let us illustrate some of these a 
bit further: 
 
                                                 
2 In public communication about policy intentions, several actors such as Members of Parliament, 
pressure groups, and the media are and/or can be involved.  However, we focus on communication 
coming from a Minister of the Government about non-adopted parliamentary policies.  This is the most 
controversial form of communication.  The recent Dutch Advisory Committee on the Future of 
Government Communication (CTO, 2001), also known as the Wallage Committee, interprets the 
guidelines regarding informing the public about policy intentions in a more offensive manner.  The 
Wallage Committee states that “the citizen has the right to know the content of the government’s 
intentions and its motives as well.  The citizen gets a lot of contrary information via news and paid 
information by the critics of the government’s policy.  So, it is absolutely reasonable that the government 
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a. Example 1: Newspaper ad on toll roads in the Netherlands 
In 1999 and 2000, the Dutch Minister of Transport would like to introduce a 
(proof) toll-road system in the Netherlands (which was politically accepted in the 
governmental agreement).  The powerful automobile lobby group ANWB and the 
popular national newspaper De Telegraaf were opponents of this idea. They 
organized a large-scale campaign against it by distributing stickers among drivers 
and by utilizing negative media coverage on the issue.  The Minister argued that 
press interviews were not powerful enough to respond to such an intensive 
protest. At the Minister’s insistence, the Ministry of Transport published a full-
colour one page ad in all Dutch national newspapers and main regional 
newspapers in October 2000.  This initiative was largely criticized because of the 
costs involved and the fact that the Government communicated about policy 
intentions that were not yet adopted by Parliament.  In addition, the governmental 
ad did not clearly communicate the status of the policy issue by using affirmative 
expressions such as "In this advertisement we mention the most important policy 
measures" (instead of policy intentions). 
 
b. Example 2: Governmental leaflet on drug policy in Belgium 
Between 2001 and 2004, communication about the Belgian federal cannabis 
legislation can be called "poor" due to (among other factors) incomplete, 
untimely, inconsistent, tendentious and polemical information provisions from the 
federal ministers.  In February 2001, the Government tried to shed some light on 
both the policy and the status of the legislation by advertising in newspapers.  The 
Federal Minister for Public Health also distributed 600,000 leaflets to explain the 
new policy.  Discussion on the leaflets focused on the use of public funds in 
support of policy proposals as well as the manner in which the leaflet presented 
the new law.  Critics and even colleagues within the Federal Government objected 
to what they alleged were omissions and misleading inaccuracies.  The leaflet did 
not mention the fact that the new bill was still to be adopted by Parliament, neither 
that the Council of State’s advice was still required, nor that the law had yet to be 
examined for compatibility with international treaties.  The leaflet strongly 
anticipated the political process in explicitly stating that the bill would be 
accepted within a few months.  In reality, it took over two years before the bill 
was enacted. 
 
We now turn to the arguments in favor of public communication about policy 
intentions. 
                                                                                                                                               
can also use all the information channels in the formulation stage of policy making.”  We focus on the use 
of paid advertisements and leaflets as these are the most disputed communication formats in this context. 
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ARGUMENTS FOR COMMUNICATION OF POLICY INTENTIONS 
Counterbalancing misleading or incorrect information from opponents and the media 
An important argument for communication about policy intentions (by paid publicity) 
from the Government is that other actors such as the opposition, pressure groups and the 
media communicate one-sidedly or incorrectly about the policy intentions of the 
Government (Tiemeijer and Rijnja 2001; CTO 2001).  If it wants to be heard, the 
Government needs to communicate via paid publicity.  When its communication is 
restricted to the free press (press interviews, press conferences) only, it would be too 
hard to apply counter-pressure to the misleading or incorrect communication from other 
actors such as the media and opponents. 
More efficient 
Another argument for communicating policy intentions is that it can help the 
Government to implement and maintain the adopted policy. As a result, public policy 
becomes more efficient. Many policies within the formulation process are not 
controversial. In such cases, the Government only needs to communicate about a 
'reservation of acceptance'. As a result, citizens and organizations can prepare for a 
policy that will most likely be adopted.  If, for instance, the rate modifications for the 
subsidies to be used in January the following year are only published "after acceptance 
by the parliament during the last meeting in December” (translated), Tiemeijer and 
Rijnja (2001: 190), consider this inefficient for the implementation of public policy. 
It is also argued that communication about policy intentions reduces or avoids 
unintended consequences later on, such as surprises, misunderstandings, resistance, 
frustrations, and speculation among citizens and organizations.  The extent of support 
and resistance by the public as well as the importance of the counterarguments of 
citizens become clarified, which thus creates opportunities for fine-tuning the policy or 
for strengthening the argumentation for the (intended) policy. 
More democratic 
Seydel, Van Ruler and Scholten (2002) state that the openness and freedom of 
information has evolved during the last few decades.  In the past, openness and freedom 
of information were crucial conditions for public information provisions in the service 
of democracy. This idea has now been expanded to include the openness and 
transparency of the policy-making process itself.  Presently, organizations must be good 
in the traditional sense of the result, but they also have to be good in the current sense of 
the procedure: they must be accountable to the often complicated working and policy-
making procedures providing the basis of their qualitative products or services 
(Bouckaert 1995).  Today, there seems to be a consensus on the use of paid publicity 
(e.g. campaigns) if the Government aims to stimulate citizens in participating in societal 
debates and thus seeks to stimulate interaction in the policy-making processes. 
The proponents of more proactive communication about policy intentions 
(communication initiated by the Government itself) stress that voters must continuously 
be kept informed about the political points of view and about whether they are 
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controversial.  The Government would also more easily gain a realistic understanding of 
the possible reactions by population segments through publicly communicating policy 
intentions.  Some authors even state that one bypasses the intermediary bodies of 
deliberative democracy, i.e. the organizations, pressure groups and parties that in the 
past mediated political issues and brokered consensus.  Consequently, there would be 
more direct democracy (Meyer 2002). 
Defenders of public communication about policy intentions also state that this type of 
communication clarifies what is going on within the political world ("the organized 
difference in opinion").  Politics would become more exciting and less detached from 
everyday life and people.  As a result, the broad public would become more interested 
in politics and policies. We now turn to the arguments against public communication 
about policy intentions. 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMMUNICATION ABOUT POLICY INTENTIONS 
State propaganda 
Opponents consider it dangerous when the Government uses public finances to 
communicate policy intentions unless its communication is explicitly meant to stimulate 
participation in interactive policy-making processes (Volmer, 2000).  The Government 
would become too powerful in comparison to the opponents of governmental policy. In 
addition, such ministerial or governmental communication may easily focus on the 
minister (as an individual politician) rather than on the content of the intended policy. 
Less efficient 
Some believe that prematurely publishing policy intentions may disturb the formulation 
or development of policy and eventually also its success.  Government may have wasted 
time and money when the plan is not implemented. Moreover, the internal deliberative 
processes between politicians and civil servants would come under pressure and thus 
hamper the civil servants' operations (Van Gisteren and Wassenaar 2003, p. 29-30). 
Less democratic 
The final important argument against governmental communication about policy 
intentions deals with the democratic characteristics of the policy-making process.  The 
Parliament is no longer the first body to be informed of the Government’s intention. 
Government over-anticipates parliamentary adoption. 
Finally, there is the risk of confusing policy intentions with policy decisions on two 
accounts: the fact that politicians often communicate about their policy intentions via 
the media and/or because politicians, media, etc. communicate in an incomplete and 
inconsistent manner. 
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Gelders' (2005a) empirical study shows how poor public communication about policy 
intentions cause confusion in two particular Belgian cases: the abolition of the 
television and radio license fee in Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) and 
the federal cannabis policy.  A few months before the abolition of the television and 
radio license fee, the contact center of the Flanders Authority received 1,625 calls a day 
about the abolition only.  Normally this contact center received about 1,700 calls a day 
regardless of the specific issue (Gelders & Walrave, 2003).  Only 12.3% of the highly 
educated citizens that were interviewed in 2002 provided correct answers to questions 
about the abolition, such as "Is the television and radio fee abolished".  In comparison, 
30% of (Belgian) citizens correctly answered questions about policy measures as was 
demonstrated by Dewachter (1993).  In the case of the abolition of the television and 
radio license fee, this score was much lower even though the respondents were familiar 
with politics in general. 
The results of Gelders’ case study of the knowledge of young people on the cannabis 
legislation were roughly similar. Two surveys - one survey in March 2003 and one in 
December 2004 - demonstrated that there was great confusion about the status and the 
content of the legislation.  This was confirmed by the large number of calls to the 
contact center of the Flemish Association of Alcohol and other Drug Problems about 
cannabis legislation. 
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COMMUNICATION ABOUT POLICY INTENTIONS IS CONTROVERSIAL 
Communication about policy intentions is controversial: (a) several negative features 
make such communication objectionable and (b) the question of publicly paid publicity 
(governmental leaflets, newspaper ads) in the policy preparation stage is particularly 
controversial.  In the following, we attempt to offer a balanced appreciation of these 
controversies. 
(a) Communication about policy intentions is characterized by many positive aspects.  
Such communication is not only positive for the image of a politician, party or 
Government, but also for the policy a minister would like to realize.  As such, image 
management is not objectionable.  A positive image of a minister may also be good for 
his/her policy and vice versa.  Sometimes, it is advisable to communicate policy 
intentions in an influencing (commercial/canvassing) way as to stimulate citizens’ 
participation in a societal debate.  It is also a way in which to open up debates with 
other politicians and citizens on possible new policies.  Thanks to this communication, 
other politicians may be pushed to publish and argue their point of view or to go along 
with the ministerial intended policy for which the cooperation of other politicians 
(ministers, MP's) is necessary.  Consequently, policy may be realized more efficiently.  
To the extent that policies strive for noble goals, there is something to say for publicly 
communicating policy intentions.  But how far can a minister go in this matter?  When 
does the activation end?  When does putting pressure on colleagues start? 
Some politicians, communication professionals and academics plead for discussing all 
policy ideas internally before going public, as was illustrated in Gelders' research.  
Gelders states: “If you act in this way, the policy will not be enacted.” (Gelders, 2005a).  
The question is what happens when all the means (putting coalition partners openly 
under pressure) become admissible for reaching particular goals (realizing the policy)?  
In that case, only the soft law of ministerial accountability plays a role.  Although there 
is no real legal sanction, this soft law is not unimportant.  If the voter disapproves of 
such a governmental communication style, he/she can blame the Government or 
Minister.  A Minister who continuously communicates his policy intentions without 
taking into consideration the other parties risks things blowing up in his own face 
(getting the same treatment, public disapproval, etc.). 
It must be said that in some cases governments do not want to signal their policy 
intentions in advance.  For example, the US Government was very secretive about the 
recent increase in taxes on US expatriates as part of the Tax Law approved in May 2006 
because the proponents did not want lobbyists to have a chance to mobilize support 
against the proposal. 
(b) Influencing communication about policy intentions may help accomplishing noble 
goals.  From a political science and communication science perspective, we argue that 
governmental communication about policy intentions should principally meet quality 
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criteria such as a complete, a factual, timely, consistent, and comprehensible 
information provision.
3
 
These criteria should also be applied to the information provisions occurring in the 
(free) press as stated by the politicians themselves (and thus not only in paid publicity).  
Political actions probably become less sexy in such a scenario.  Ultimately, however, 
striving for quality criteria, as mentioned above, is good for the legitimacy of 
governmental operations. 
Based on in-depth interviews of 32 Belgian governmental communication professionals, 
Gelders (2005a) concluded that they underestimate the societal and financial costs of 
poor public information provisions about policy intentions.  At times there is still too 
great a focus on the specific forms of such communication (such as the use of paid 
publicity) and not enough attention for the quality of other forms (such as press 
interviews, conferences, etc.).  The reasoning behind the positive view on press 
communication seems to be that such communication is cheaper than paid publicity 
utilizing the mass media (leaflets, newspaper ads, etc.) and that the press knows what is 
just an intention and what is already a decision according to the interviewees (although 
they also admit that the press is not always capable and is certainly not always willing 
to distinguish between policy intentions and policy measures).  Above that, several 
political journalists admit that they do not always know the exact status of policy 
intentions (see Lahousse 2005).  Poor press communication may also be costly as such 
communication can create confusion leading to setting up government campaigns, 
staffing contact centers etc. (Gelders 2005b). 
This statement is not a matter of pessimism but, in our view, a realistic assessment of 
the outputs and costs of one aspect of communication about policy intentions that has so 
far received little attention from the policy-makers and has been scarcely the subject of 
academic research. 
 
Dave Gelders, Lecturer, Leuven School for Mass Communication Research - Public 
Management Institute, K.U.Leuven, Belgium: dave.gelders@soc.kuleuven.be 
Marleen Brans, Professor, Public Management Institute, K.U.Leuven, Belgium: 
marleen.brans@soc.kuleuven.be 
                                                 
3 When it is about operational issues implying financial consequences to the general public, it is self-
evident that the information must be provided in accordance with the quality standards mentioned above.  
But should these standards be applied in all cases?  For example, take the monetary policy intentions from 
the Federal Reserve (Fed).  “Because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time-
inconsistent policy, the Fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly.  It can, however, 
communicate some information about its goals through the ‘cheap talk’ mechanisms of Crawford and 
Sobel: making announcements that are imprecise, and only give ranges within which these goals may lie." 
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